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Abstract:	  	  Conflicting	  interests	  among	  private	  actors	  constitute	  an	  important	  factor	  to	  
explain	  why	  and	  how	  transnational	  private	  regulation	  has	  grown	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  
standards	  and	  standard	  setting	  organizations	  that	  has	  followed.	  This	  essay	  provides	  a	  
map	  of	  transnational	  regulatory	  space	  suggesting	  that	  the	  different	  levels	  are	  related	  to	  
various	  governance	  responses	  to	  conflicts	  within	  the	  private	  sphere	  and	  between	  
private	  and	  public	  actors.	  Three	  levels	  of	  the	  global	  regulatory	  space	  are	  considered:	  (1)	  
the	  single	  global	  regulatory	  body,	  where	  interests	  are	  integrated	  into	  one	  organization,	  
(2)	  the	  regime,	  in	  which	  multiple	  organizations	  operate,	  regulating	  within	  the	  same	  
policy	  field,	  (3)	  multiple	  regimes	  often	  associated	  with	  different,	  often	  conflicting,	  
policies	  that	  interplay	  cooperatively	  or	  competitively.	  Unlike	  in	  the	  traditional	  multilevel	  
governance	  literature,	  where	  ‘levels’	  are	  primarily	  defined	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  territorial	  
metric,	  here	  the	  notion	  of	  regulatory	  space	  is	  functional	  and	  independent	  from	  the	  
administrative	  boundaries	  of	  nation	  states.	  	  For	  the	  three	  levels,	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  key	  
governance	  features	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  
regulators,	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  and	  how	  their	  conflicting	  interests	  are	  balanced	  
at	  the	  organizational	  and/or	  regime	  level.	  Depending	  on	  how	  the	  interests	  of	  regulatees	  
and	  beneficiaries	  are	  combined,	  different	  governance	  options	  will	  emerge:	  creating	  
single	  or	  multiple	  regulators,	  defining	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  whole	  regime,	  in	  particular	  
the	  alternative	  between	  monopoly	  and	  plurality	  of	  private	  regulators,	  or	  creating	  
independent	  regimes,	  each	  one	  representing	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  constituency	  with	  
potentially	  policies’	  interdependencies.	  The	  selection	  of	  the	  legal	  instruments,	  in	  
particular	  the	  choice	  between	  contract	  and	  organization	  to	  coordinate	  conflicting	  
interests	  is	  correlated	  to	  the	  level:	  organization	  law	  is	  more	  important	  in	  the	  first	  level	  
while	  contract	  law	  becomes	  	  increasingly	  important	  moving	  up	  to	  the	  regime	  or	  inter-­‐
regime	  level.	  Two	  forms	  of	  governance	  are	  distinguished:	  micro-­‐governance,	  operating	  
primarily	  through	  organizations	  where	  judicial	  intervention	  by	  domestic	  courts	  is	  very	  
limited;	  macro-­‐governance,	  using	  transactional	  rather	  than	  organizational	  tools,	  
deploying	  coordination	  mechanisms	  between	  organizations	  or	  regimes	  representing	  
different	  interests	  (trade	  and	  environment,	  e-­‐commerce	  and	  data	  protection,	  labour	  and	  
consumer).	  In	  the	  latter	  case	  the	  role	  of	  domestic	  Courts	  increases	  to	  regulate	  conflicts	  
and	  allocate	  ex	  post	  the	  regulatory	  space.	  	  
The	  paper	  concludes	  arguing	  that	  the	  future	  of	  TPR	  and	  its	  effectiveness	  will	  depend	  on	  
the	  choice	  among	  these	  different	  levels	  which	  will	  be	  partly	  driven	  by	  endogenous	  
factors,	  and	  partly	  by	  exogenous	  legal	  and	  non	  legal	  factors,	  among	  which	  competition	  
law	  is	  likely	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role.	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INTRODUCTION	  
For	  many,	  ‘private	  regulation’	  remains	  an	  oxymoron.	  In	  conventional	  analysis	  where	  
markets	  and	  states	  are	  juxtaposed,	  regulation	  sits	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  latter,	  and	  it	  is	  
almost	  by	  definition	  public.	  The	  private	  sphere	  has	  often	  been	  associated	  with	  de-­‐
regulation,	  operating	  in	  markets,	  regulated	  primarily	  by	  competition	  law.	  This	  view	  is	  
flawed	  and	  reflects	  a	  balance	  between	  markets	  and	  states,	  i.e.	  private	  and	  public,	  which	  
does	  not	  hold	  anymore,	  if	  it	  ever	  even	  existed.	  The	  regulatory	  space	  has	  dramatically	  
changed,	  both	  at	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  level,	  with	  transfers	  from	  public	  to	  private	  
and	  from	  national	  to	  transnational.	  These	  shifts	  have	  occurred	  with	  different	  degrees	  
depending	  on	  the	  field1.	  In	  certain	  areas,	  the	  ‘privatization’	  of	  regulation	  has	  coincided	  with	  
a	  much	  higher	  concentration	  of	  regulatory	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  private	  actors;	  in	  other	  
areas	  a	  powerful,	  competitive	  process	  among	  private	  regulators	  has	  developed	  with	  the	  
proliferation	  of	  private	  standards	  and	  their	  fragmentation.	  Within	  this	  framework	  private	  
meta-­‐regulators	  have	  emerged	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  common,	  primarily	  procedural,	  rules	  to	  
foster	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  private	  standards	  or	  legal	  integration	  by	  way	  of	  
harmonization.	  	  
The	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007/8	  has	  redefined	  the	  balance	  between	  public	  and	  private,	  
eroding	  but	  certainly	  not	  eliminating	  the	  role	  of	  private	  regulation2.	  The	  flow	  of	  regulatory	  
power	  moves	  from	  private	  to	  public	  and	  from	  public	  to	  private	  according	  to	  sectors	  unlike	  
at	  the	  domestic	  level	  where	  more	  uniform	  trends	  across	  fields	  can	  be	  detected.	  
Transnational	  regulation	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  regimes,	  each	  one	  
focusing	  either	  on	  a	  single	  policy	  or	  on	  a	  set	  of	  integrated	  policies.	  	  In	  the	  field	  of	  public	  
international	  law,	  this	  proliferation	  has	  caused	  normative	  fragmentation	  and	  triggered	  
different	  types	  of	  solutions	  depending	  on	  the	  regulatory	  instrument	  and	  its	  legal	  status3.	  
The	  use	  of	  soft	  law	  has	  grown	  triggering	  the	  use	  of	  	  different	  techniques	  of	  coordination	  
between	  hard	  	  and	  soft	  law	  instruments.	  In	  the	  private	  field,	  the	  growth	  is	  more	  recent	  but	  
1 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); Colin Scott, Analysis of Regulatory 
Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design, Public Law, Summer, 2001, at 283-305;  JACINT JORDANA, J.  & DAVID 
LEVI-FAUR, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (2004); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM (2008); Kenneth W. Abbott & 
Duncan Snidal, THE Governance Triangle, Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in  THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL REGULATION, 44 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, eds., 2009); Julia Black, Legitimacy and the Competition for 
Regulatory Share, LSE W.P. 2009/14, available at: www.lse.ac.uk; Tim Buthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy a 
(P)review, 12:3 BUS.& POL. (2010).
2 See IMF 2011 and FSB, 2010. A good illustration of the rebalancing between public and private is the changing but 
still rather relevant role of ISDA in the regulation of CDS and over the counter transactions. The regulatory responses were first 
given by ISDA (2008, 2009) and then by the Financial stability Board (FSB) in 2010 and by domestic legislation in the US and 
Europe. Similar patterns in relation to Credit Rating Agencies.
3 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law – Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, 58th Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006). 
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it	  is	  generating	  strong	  competition	  and	  fragmentation	  rather	  than	  harmonization,	  at	  least	  
in	  certain	  fields	  like	  food	  safety,	  environmental	  protection	  and	  corporate	  social	  
responsibility	  (CSR).	  Proliferation	  increases	  uncertainty	  without	  necessarily	  fostering	  
regulatory	  innovation.	  Institutional	  responses	  have	  been	  called	  for	  in	  order	  to	  govern	  the	  
process	  of	  multiplication.	  The	  focus,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  private	  sphere,	  is	  on	  a	  particular	  
dimension	  of	  normative	  fragmentation:	  governance	  responses	  to	  conflicts	  within	  
organizations,	  between	  organizations	  within	  a	  regime,	  and	  among	  regimes.	  
TPR	  differs	  from	  traditional	  private	  rule	  making,	  particularly	  lex	  mercatoria,	  because	  of	  (1)	  
its	  stronger	  regulatory	  emphasis,	  (2)	  the	  identity	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  regulatory	  process	  -­‐	  
particularly	  the	  role	  of	  NGOs	  -­‐	  and	  (3)	  the	  effects	  on	  third	  parties4.	  
In	  TPRs,	  the	  regulator	  is	  a	  private	  entity	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  coincide	  with	  regulated	  
entities.	  A	  radical	  change	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  private	  regulatory	  
regimes	  where	  there	  is	  no	  coincidence	  between	  regulator	  and	  regulatees	  as	  it	  was	  
generally	  the	  case	  in	  conventional	  self-­‐regulation.	  The	  regulatory	  process	  is	  in	  place	  to	  
protect	  various	  interests,	  concerning	  regulated	  entities,	  and	  third	  parties	  (beneficiaries).	  
The	  beneficiaries	  are	  those	  who	  are	  likely	  to	  benefit	  from	  compliance	  by	  the	  regulated	  
entities,	  and	  likely	  to	  be	  harmed	  by	  infringements	  of	  the	  private	  regulatory	  regimes5.	  Thus,	  
a	  private	  regulator	  can	  set	  rules	  affecting	  regulated	  entities	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  third	  parties,	  
(e.g.	  NGOs,	  consumers	  or	  other	  enterprises,	  e.g.	  competitors).	  It	  can	  also	  monitor,	  directly	  
or	  indirectly,	  compliance	  and	  enforce	  violations	  to	  ensure	  that	  interests	  are	  adequately	  
protected.	  	  
The	  private	  regulatory	  sphere	  is	  not	  homogeneous.	  It	  consists	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  private	  
actors,	  representing	  numerous	  (often	  conflicting)	  interests6.	  Industries	  and	  NGOs	  often	  
develop	  competitive	  regulatory	  regimes	  which,	  sometimes,	  subsequently	  merge	  into	  a	  
multi-­‐stakeholder	  organization,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  Forest	  Stewardship	  Council	  (FSC).	  Empirical	  
evidence	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  general	  trend	  towards	  the	  creation	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  
organizations	  and	  regimes7.	  This	  trend	  varies	  depending	  on	  the	  maturity	  of	  the	  regime	  
showing	  an	  evolutionary	  pattern:	  younger	  legal	  regimes	  are	  generally	  more	  fragmented,	  
older	  tend	  to	  consolidate	  and	  at	  times	  merge.	  	  
Private	  actors	  are	  often	  occupying	  different	  positions	  in	  the	  global	  regulatory	  space.	  NGOs	  
are	  both	  promoting	  their	  own	  regulatory	  regimes,	  especially	  in	  certification,	  and	  
participating	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  regimes	  with	  firms	  and/or	  independent	  experts	  in	  
standard	  setting.	  Even	  within	  the	  same	  group	  or	  constituency,	  conflicting	  interests	  emerge.	  
4 David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261-282 (2008); F. Cafaggi, New 
foundations of transnational private regulation, EUI/RSCAS w.p. 2010. 
5 Beneficiaries often take the form of NGOS but may also be competitors or firms along the supply chain. Fabrizio 
Cafaggi, Rethinking Self-Regulation in European Private Law, in REFRAMING SELF-REGULATION IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 3 
(Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2006). 
6 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1; Vogel, supra note 4; MARK A. POLLACK & GREGORY C. SHAFFER, WHEN 
COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2009); David Levi-Faur, 
Regulation and Regulatory Governance (unpublished paper, 2009); ABBOTT & SNIDAL, supra note 1; Jonathan Zeitlin, Pragmatic 
transnationalism: governance across borders in the global economy, Presidential Address, 9 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 187-206 
(2010), Buthe, supra note 1; Cafaggi, supra note 4. 
7 ABBOTT & SNIDAL, supra note 1, at 53 ff.
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In	  the	  business	  domain,	  often	  the	  interests	  of	  multinational	  corporations	  (MNC)	  conflict	  
with	  small	  and	  medium	  enterprises	  (SMEs)	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  regulatory	  
costs	  and	  the	  benefits	  from	  compliance	  with	  CSR,	  environmental	  or	  safety	  regulation.	  In	  the	  
domain	  of	  NGOs,	  consumer	  interests	  may	  conflict	  with	  labor,	  which	  at	  the	  same	  time	  may	  
conflict	  with	  environmental	  protection	  interests.	  Examples	  range	  from	  conflicts	  between	  
fundamental	  rights	  and	  consumer	  protection,	  environmental	  and	  consumer	  protection,	  and	  
labor	  and	  consumer.	  Stricter	  process	  standards	  increasing	  environmental	  protection	  may	  
translate	  into	  stricter	  product	  standards	  raisining	  the	  costs	  of	  final	  products	  passed	  on	  
consumers.	  The	  distributional	  effects	  of	  different	  regulatory	  regimes	  may	  thus	  translate	  
into	  conflicts.	  
TPR	  includes	  forms	  of	  (1)	  voluntary,	  (2)	  promoted	  and	  (3)	  mandatory	  regulation.	  In	  the	  
first	  case,	  membership	  of	  the	  organization	  or	  agreement	  is	  voluntary;	  in	  the	  second	  
scenario,	  access	  to	  the	  regime	  is	  linked	  with	  tax	  or	  other	  types	  of	  benefits	  for	  the	  
regulatees,	  sometimes	  partly	  transferred	  to	  the	  beneficiaries;	  in	  the	  third	  instance,	  the	  
regulated	  entity	  may	  be	  bound	  to	  comply	  with	  private	  regulation,	  even	  against	  their	  will,	  by	  
legislation	  or	  administrative	  regulation.	  The	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  private	  voluntary	  regimes,	  but	  
the	  approach	  can	  be	  expanded	  to	  the	  other	  forms	  of	  private	  regulation.	  The	  voluntary	  
nature	  of	  TPR	  has	  important	  governance	  implications	  that	  partly	  explain	  the	  differences	  
with	  global	  public	  regulation.	  Private	  standards	  are	  voluntary,	  but,	  once	  adopted,	  their	  
compliance	  is	  legally	  binding	  and	  legal	  and	  non	  legal	  sanctions	  are	  imposed	  on	  those	  who	  
breach	  the	  rules.	  Since	  membership	  is	  voluntary,	  incentives	  to	  become	  a	  member	  are	  of	  
great	  importance.	  	  
Differences	  emerge	  between	  public	  and	  private	  organizations	  and	  regimes	  in	  addressing	  
conflicts.	  The	  design	  and	  criteria	  to	  draw	  legal	  boundaries	  of	  the	  different	  spheres	  affect	  
policies’	  interdependences.	  The	  toolbox	  to	  correlate	  interdependences	  and	  regimes’	  
independence	  are	  different	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres.	  
In	  the	  public	  landscape,	  international	  organizations	  (IO)	  are	  created	  as	  autonomous	  and	  
independent	  bodies,	  which	  often	  try	  to	  govern	  themselves	  as	  ‘independent	  legal	  orders’.	  
However,	  they	  do	  not	  act	  in	  a	  normative	  vacuum,	  but	  inside	  a	  legal	  framework	  defined	  by	  
jus	  cogens,	  customary	  international	  law	  and	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  international	  law.	  
Their	  addressees	  used	  to	  be	  States,	  increasingly	  including	  non	  members	  as	  well	  as	  
members.	  In	  their	  standard	  setting	  activities	  progressively	  I.O.	  have	  addressed	  directly	  
private	  actors,	  primarily	  enterprises,	  instead	  of	  member	  States.	  Examples	  of	  codes	  of	  
conduct	  or	  best	  recommended	  practices	  addressed	  to	  multinational	  corporations	  have	  
been	  enacted	  by	  OECD,	  ILO,	  FAO,	  WHO,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  
In	  the	  private	  domain,	  private	  regimes	  can	  have	  contractual	  or	  organizational	  forms	  or	  be	  
the	  result	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  two8.	  Regulatory	  contracts	  arise	  when	  firms	  agree	  on	  
rules	  concerning	  their	  conducts	  and	  commit	  to	  comply	  with	  reciprocal	  undertakings.	  
8 Id. and supra note 4. 
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Contractual	  models	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  bilateral	  connected	  contracts,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  of	  
regulation	  along	  supply	  chain	  where	  clauses	  concerning	  safety,	  environmental	  
sustainability,	  compliance	  with	  ISO	  standards	  are	  homogenously	  reproduced.	  Alternatively	  
they	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  multiparty	  contracts,	  for	  example	  network	  contracts.	  This	  is	  often	  
the	  case	  in	  financial	  markets	  where	  master	  agreement	  (for	  example	  ISDA)	  or	  rulebooks	  
(Euro	  payment	  system	  SEPA)	  are	  deployed.	  	  
	  
Organizational	  forms	  deploy	  generally	  associational	  (FSC,	  ISO,	  MSC)	  or	  foundational	  
models	  (GRI,	  IASB).	  Sometimes	  the	  for-­‐profit	  model	  is	  also	  deployed	  when	  the	  regulatory	  
activity	  generates	  profits	  for	  the	  regulators.	  
	  
Often	  the	  two	  instruments	  are	  combined	  and	  organizational	  models,	  including	  associations	  
or	  foundations	  composed	  of	  multiple	  stakeholders,	  use	  master	  agreements	  or	  codes	  of	  
conduct	  to	  regulate	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  members	  and	  their	  relationships	  with	  third	  parties.	  
Private	  actors	  regulate	  markets	  and	  social	  conduct	  both	  at	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  
level,	  addressing	  also	  market	  and	  governmental	  failures	  which	  take	  specific	  features	  at	  the	  
transnational	  level.	  If	  considered	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  public	  spheres	  they	  constitute	  
private	  orderings	  based	  on	  freedom	  of	  contract	  and	  freedom	  of	  association.	  Private	  
autonomy	  defines	  the	  boundaries	  of	  action	  and	  effects.	  They	  operate	  as	  independent	  
private	  orderings	  but,	  unlike	  the	  international	  organizations,	  without	  a	  common	  
transnational	  frame	  of	  private	  rules.	  National	  private	  law	  systems	  fill	  in	  any	  gaps	  that	  are	  
left	  by	  transnational	  private	  regulation	  but	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  common	  core	  of	  rules	  valid	  
across	  boundaries.	  Current	  research	  is	  trying	  to	  identify	  these	  common	  principles	  by	  
engaging	  in	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  private	  regimes9.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  essay,	  I	  analyze	  the	  governance	  designs	  in	  TPR	  through	  the	  lenses	  of	  the	  regulatory	  
relationship	  between	  regulators,	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  to	  show	  that	  the	  regulatory	  
space	  reflects	  the	  different	  modes	  of	  addressing	  conflicts	  among	  these	  categories10.	  
Three	  levels	  of	  the	  global	  regulatory	  space	  are	  considered:	  (1)	  the	  single	  regulatory	  body,	  
(2)	  the	  regime,	  in	  which	  multiple	  organizations	  operate	  regulating	  within	  the	  same	  policy	  
field,	  (3)	  multiple	  regimes	  associated	  with	  different,	  often	  conflicting,	  policies	  interplay	  
cooperatively	  or	  competitively.	  Unlike	  in	  the	  traditional	  multilevel	  governance	  literature,	  
where	  ‘levels’	  are	  defined	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  territorial	  metric,	  here	  the	  notion	  of	  regulatory	  
space	  is	  functional	  and	  independent	  from	  the	  administrative	  boundaries	  of	  nation	  states.	  	  
For	  the	  three	  levels,	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  key	  governance	  features	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  different	  
forms	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  and	  how	  their	  conflicting	  
interests	  are	  balanced	  at	  the	  organizational	  and/or	  regime	  level.	  Depending	  on	  how	  the	  
interests	  of	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  are	  combined,	  different	  governance	  options	  will	  
emerge:	  creating	  single	  or	  multiple	  regulators,	  defining	  the	  architecture	  of	  the	  whole	  
regime,	  in	  particular	  the	  alternative	  between	  monopoly	  and	  plurality	  of	  private	  regulators,	  
and	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  legal	  instrument	  between	  contract	  and	  organization	  to	  coordinate	  
conflicting	  constituencies.	  	  
                                                
9             See the HIIL project on transnational private regulation at www.privateregulation.eu 
10  Cafaggi, supra note 4.  
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Two	  forms	  of	  governance	  are	  distinguished:	  micro-­‐governance,	  operating	  through	  
organizations;	  and	  macro-­‐governance,	  using	  transactional	  rather	  than	  organizational	  tools,	  
deploying	  coordination	  mechanisms	  between	  organizations	  or	  regimes.	  
	  
The	  Regulatory	  Relationship	  in	  TPR	  	  
 
Unlike	  conventional	  forms	  of	  self-­‐regulation,	  primarily	  promoted	  and	  governed	  by	  
industry,	  where	  there	  is	  a	  formal	  coincidence	  between	  regulators	  and	  the	  regulated,	  TPR	  
concerns	  regulatory	  relationships	  among	  regulators,	  regulated	  entities,	  beneficiaries	  and	  
also	  third	  parties	  which	  can	  be	  negatively	  affected	  by	  private	  regulation11.	  Regulatory	  
beneficiaries	  are	  those	  whose	  interests	  are	  legally	  or	  socially	  protected,	  i.e	  those	  whose	  
welfare	  will	  be	  enhanced	  by	  the	  implementation	  of	  private	  regulation	  or	  conversely	  
harmed	  by	  the	  violation	  of	  private	  regulation.	  The	  concept	  of	  regulatory	  relationship,	  
including	  both	  regulated	  entities	  and	  beneficiaries,	  broadens	  the	  reach	  of	  regulatory	  
responsiveness.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  beneficiaries	  in	  the	  regulatory	  space	  changes	  the	  
relationship	  between	  legitimacy	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  regulatory	  process	  since	  it	  forces	  
to	  consider	  the	  effects	  produced	  by	  compliance	  or	  infringements	  of	  private	  rules	  on	  third	  
parties	  who	  are	  not	  members	  of	  the	  regulatory	  body.	  
	  
One	  can	  further	  distinguish	  between	  intentional	  and	  incidental	  beneficiaries.	  The	  former	  
are	  those	  who	  are	  expressly	  targeted	  by	  the	  regulatory	  regime,	  while	  the	  latter	  are	  those	  
who	  may	  incidentally	  be	  benefited	  by	  compliance	  with	  the	  rules	  or	  harmed	  by	  their	  
violations.	  	  In	  financial	  market	  transnational	  private	  regulation,	  investors	  and	  depositors	  
can	  be	  considered	  intentional	  beneficiaries,	  taxpayers	  may	  be	  incidental	  beneficiaries	  or,	  as	  
was	  the	  case	  in	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  those	  negatively	  affected	  by	  the	  drawbacks	  of	  the	  
previous	  regulatory	  regimes.	  As	  the	  regulatory	  responses	  show,	  often	  there	  have	  been	  
regulatory	  and	  distributional	  conflicts	  among	  these	  categories	  both	  within	  the	  public	  and	  
the	  private	  domain.	  Similar	  conflicts	  arise	  in	  the	  context	  of	  agriculture	  between	  
environmental	  protection	  and	  food	  policies	  with	  food	  producers	  being	  forced	  to	  endorse	  
sustainable	  environmental	  standards.	  A	  third	  example	  is	  the	  conflict	  between	  e-­‐commerce	  
and	  data	  protection	  where	  e-­‐trade-­‐restrictive	  provisions	  may	  be	  enacted	  to	  ensure	  that	  
personal	  data	  circulate	  only	  upon	  consent	  of	  the	  interested	  parties.	  
	  
The	  protection	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  can	  occur	  (1)	  within	  one	  organization,	  (2)	  within	  a	  
single	  regime	  by	  creating	  alternative	  regulatory	  bodies,	  proposing	  competing	  or	  
complementary	  rules,	  or	  (3)	  by	  generating	  a	  new	  regulatory	  regime	  altogether.	  The	  choices	  
are	  often	  driven	  by	  strategic	  considerations	  of	  the	  different	  players	  and	  their	  bargaining	  
power.	  In	  some	  circumstances	  new	  regimes	  have	  been	  promoted	  by	  NGOs,	  in	  other	  
circumstances	  by	  firms	  who	  could	  benefit	  from	  stricter	  environmental	  standards,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  green	  economy.	  Often	  these	  different	  levels	  are	  connected.	  One	  NGO	  representing	  
environmental	  or	  consumer	  interests	  may	  try	  to	  gain	  a	  voice	  in	  a	  standard-­‐	  setting	  
                                                
11  Id., New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J. L. & SOC’Y 20 ff. (2011). 
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organization	  characterized	  by	  a	  dominance	  of	  firms;	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  or	  later,	  once	  
sufficient	  reputation	  has	  been	  created,	  it	  can	  generate	  a	  new	  regulatory	  body	  or	  even	  
contribute	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  regulatory	  regime	  by	  imposing	  stricter	  standards	  in	  
order	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  firm-­‐led	  regulatory	  regime.	  	  
Self-­‐regulation	  has	  been	  often	  accused	  of	  protecting	  only	  regulatees’	  interests.	  In	  TPR,	  this	  
is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  is	  relevant	  to	  ensure	  legitimacy	  of	  
the	  regulatory	  process	  and	  private	  regulators	  have	  increasingly	  conferred	  procedural	  
rights	  to	  non	  members.	  Given	  the	  voluntary	  nature	  of	  TPR,	  the	  regulatees	  will	  subscribe	  to	  
a	  specific	  regulatory	  regime,	  only	  if	  the	  beneficiaries	  recognize	  and	  appreciate	  that	  regime.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  consumers,	  this	  recognition	  will	  influence	  transactional	  choices,	  i.e.	  the	  
selection	  of	  the	  enterprises	  from	  which	  products	  or	  services	  are	  bought.	  Certification	  is	  
perhaps	  the	  best	  illustration	  of	  the	  beneficiaries’	  strategic	  role	  (consumers)	  in	  defining	  the	  
incentives	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  private	  regime,	  often	  overlooked	  in	  regulatory	  discourse	  
describing	  the	  transnational	  regulatory	  space.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  context,	  the	  reach	  of	  responsibility	  is	  extremely	  important	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  
identity	  of	  the	  beneficiaries.	  Responsibility	  regimes,	  including	  legal	  liability,	  define	  the	  
effects	  of	  a	  regulatory	  regime	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  beneficiaries	  are	  ‘formal’	  members	  
of	  the	  regulatory	  body.	  Civil	  liability	  before	  domestic	  courts	  represents	  an	  additional	  tool	  to	  
empower	  beneficiaries.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  the	  UN	  Global	  Compact	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
CSR,	  the	  definition	  of	  spheres	  of	  influences	  designs	  the	  boundaries	  of	  responsibility,	  
thereby	  identifying	  the	  final	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  regime12.	  	  
	  
The	  relationship	  between	  regulators,	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  contributes	  to	  defining	  
the	  organizational	  boundaries	  and	  how	  conflicts	  are	  addressed	  within	  and	  between	  
organizations.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  should	  be	  at	  the	  strategic	  juncture	  of	  the	  governance	  
debate	  in	  transnational	  regulation.	  Governance	  responses	  may	  affect	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  
organization,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  separation	  of	  functions	  within	  the	  organization	  and	  
reallocate	  the	  power	  among	  the	  different	  actors	  within	  the	  regulatory	  relationship.	  	  
 
Micro-­‐	  and	  Macro-­‐Governance	  
 
The	  toolbox	  of	  private	  regulatory	  law	  is	  remarkably	  different	  from	  that	  of	  public	  
international	  law13.	  General	  rules	  are	  still	  lacking	  and	  transnational	  private	  regulators	  do	  
not	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  common	  core	  principles.	  Contractual	  and	  organizational	  instruments	  
regulate	  private	  organizations	  primarily	  by	  reference	  to	  domestic	  models	  of	  private	  law,	  
subject	  to	  various	  processes	  of	  hybridization	  with	  public	  law.	  Contractual	  instruments,	  
ranging	  from	  framework	  and	  master	  agreements	  to	  codes	  of	  conduct	  and	  guidelines,	  are	  
used	  not	  only	  to	  set	  standards	  but	  also	  to	  define	  compliance	  targets	  and	  monitor	  their	  
                                                
12  Clarifying the Concepts of “Spheres of Influence” and “Complicity” by John Ruggie, A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008).  
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN, A/HRC/17/31 (21 Mar., 2011); Stepan Wood, Osgoode Working Paper 2011 
13 The public/private distinction concerning regulation presents different features at the transnational level from the 
domestic landscape. The distinction between public international law and transnational private instruments concerns both 
instruments and the effects of regulatory regimes. 
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achievement14.	  The	  widespread	  use	  of	  bargaining,	  sometimes	  translating	  into	  formal	  
contracting	  (settlements),	  also	  characterizes	  enforcement,	  where	  remedies	  are	  often	  
negotiated	  between	  regulators	  and	  regulatees	  and,	  seldom,	  even	  with	  beneficiaries.	  	  This	  
essay	  follows	  the	  organizational	  approach,	  distinguishing	  between	  intra-­‐	  and	  inter-­‐
organizational	  levels,	  and	  applies	  it	  to	  the	  governance	  of	  TPRs.	  	  
	  
Two	  mechanisms	  are	  deployed	  to	  govern	  TPR	  depending	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  regulatory	  
relationship	  and	  the	  level	  of	  the	  regulatory	  space:	  micro-­‐governance,	  focusing	  mainly	  on	  
organizational	  devices,	  and	  (2)	  macro-­‐governance	  deploying	  primarily	  transactional	  
mechanisms	  including	  both	  ex	  ante	  contractual	  and	  ex	  post	  judicial	  intervention.	  
	  
Micro-­‐governance	  concerns	  single	  organizations	  and	  responds	  to	  conflicts	  among	  
constituencies	  related	  to	  the	  same	  organization,	  even	  outside	  its	  formal	  legal	  boundary:	  a	  
classic	  illustration	  is	  the	  conflict	  between	  industry	  and	  NGOs	  representing	  human	  rights,	  
consumers	  or	  environmental	  concerns,	  when	  NGOs	  are	  not	  ‘members’	  of	  the	  regulatory	  
body,	  but	  their	  interests	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  regulatory	  activity.	  They	  influence	  
organizational	  governance	  primarily	  by	  scrutinizing	  the	  regulatory	  output	  (	  codes	  of	  
conduct,	  master	  agreements,	  international	  framework	  agreements	  etc)	  and	  underline	  their	  	  
(negative)	  effects	  on	  third	  parties	  via	  consultation	  or	  litigation.	  The	  increasing	  role	  of	  
consumer	  and	  environmental	  organizations	  has	  affected	  fields	  traditionally	  characterized	  
by	  self-­‐regulation	  where	  regulators	  and	  regulatees	  coincided	  and	  private	  regulation	  
consisted	  in	  a	  club	  good.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  sector	  of	  advertising,	  for	  example,	  consumer	  organizations	  have	  used	  the	  private	  
dispute	  resolution	  systems	  set	  up	  by	  national	  SROs	  to	  bring	  claims	  against	  misleading	  
advertising	  but	  also	  to	  address	  violations	  of	  fundamental	  rights.	  The	  growing	  importance	  of	  
consumer	  claims	  has	  changed	  the	  scope	  and	  goals	  of	  advertising	  private	  regulation	  moving	  
from	  unfair	  competition	  to	  consumer	  and	  fundamental	  rights	  protection.	  As	  a	  result	  more	  
recently	  some	  of	  the	  SROs	  have	  included	  consumer	  organizations	  in	  their	  governance	  
structure	  and	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  enforcement	  body15.	  Often	  these	  efforts	  are	  
‘indirectly	  supported’	  by	  public	  institutions	  at	  national	  and	  transnational	  level	  by	  
conferring	  regulatory	  legitimacy	  in	  exchange	  of	  wider	  participation.	  In	  other	  words	  they	  
are	  aimed	  at	  rebalancing	  input	  and	  output	  legitimacy	  of	  private	  regulation.	  
	  
Macro-­‐governance	  concerns	  conflicts	  among	  different	  transnational	  regimes:	  private,	  
public	  or	  hybrids.	  Conflicts	  arise	  both	  within	  and	  among	  regimes	  and	  in	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	  
hierarchy	  of	  legal	  sources	  need	  governance	  responses.	  Conflicts	  within	  single	  regimes	  are	  
illustrated	  by	  the	  area	  of	  food	  safety	  where	  competing	  standards	  have	  arisen	  both	  at	  
                                                
14  See for example in the field of advertising EASA Best Practice Recommendations. In the field of CSR, international 
framework agreements often define objectives and targets to be met by multinational corporations. 
15  See for example the reform of ARPP in France in 2008. On these developments see P. Verbruggen, Report on 
Advertising, HIIL project on file with the author. 
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regional	  and	  global	  level16.	  Similarly	  competition	  has	  arisen	  in	  the	  field	  of	  forestry	  where	  
the	  creation	  of	  forestry	  stewardship	  Council	  	  (FSC,	  an	  NGO-­‐led	  organization	  which	  has	  
become	  multistakeholder),	  has	  been	  followed	  by	  that	  of	  Sustainable	  forestry	  initiative	  (SFI)	  
an	  industry-­‐led	  private	  organization.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  regulatory	  relationship	  between	  
regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  does	  not	  operate	  within	  a	  single	  organization	  but	  among	  
organizations.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  (groups	  of)	  regulatees	  create	  their	  own	  organizations	  and	  
design	  a	  regime.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  beneficiaries	  (consumer	  or	  environmental	  
organizations)	  respond	  by	  creating	  new	  regulatory	  bodies,	  often	  competing	  with	  those	  of	  
the	  regulatees	  (i.e.	  industry-­‐based).	  But	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  competition	  can	  even	  arise	  within	  
industry	  or	  NGOs.	  
	  
Regimes	  are	  generally	  focused	  on	  a	  single	  policy	  (trade,	  environment,	  consumer	  safety	  etc.)	  
and	  when	  policy	  goals	  diverge	  they	  conflict.	  They	  are	  legally	  independent,	  aiming	  at	  
constituting	  separate	  ‘legal	  orders’,	  but	  functionally	  interdependent.	  Coordination	  and	  
conflict	  resolution	  is	  thence	  needed	  to	  govern	  their	  interdependence17.	  If	  coordination	  is	  
lacking,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  of	  a	  serious	  risk	  that	  each	  regime	  will	  try	  externalizing	  
costs	  onto	  others,	  thereby	  producing	  inefficiencies,	  under	  or	  overproduction	  of	  standards	  





Micro-­‐governance	  depends	  (1)	  on	  power	  allocation	  between	  the	  regulatees,	  among	  them	  
and	  the	  beneficiaries,	  and	  (2)	  on	  interest	  alignment	  and/or	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	  
Governance	  responses	  may	  include	  contracts	  and/or	  organizations.	  Often	  they	  operate	  
jointly.	  Contracts	  are	  primarily	  used	  to	  setting	  standards;	  organizations	  are	  deployed	  to	  
monitor	  compliance	  and	  to	  enforce	  rules.	  The	  use	  of	  contracts	  as	  regulatory	  devices	  to	  set	  
standards	  is	  coherent	  with	  a	  rich	  menu	  of	  regulatory	  strategies,	  as	  it	  may	  be	  compatible	  
with	  different	  degrees	  of	  hierarchy	  between	  regulators	  and	  regulatees:	  standard	  contracts	  
can	  be	  used	  in	  command	  and	  control	  private	  regulation,	  while	  relational	  contracts	  are	  more	  
frequent	  in	  responsive	  regulation	  and	  spot	  contracts	  in	  market	  based	  regulation18.	  In	  
addition,	  organizational	  tools,	  associated	  with	  the	  adopted	  legal	  form,	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
ensure	  that	  members	  (regulatees)	  comply	  with	  the	  rules	  to	  which	  they	  have	  subscribed.	  
For	  example,	  there	  are	  the	  sanctions	  concerning	  membership	  such	  as	  licensing	  the	  activity	  
(related	  to	  entry	  to	  the	  regulatory	  regime),	  warning,	  suspension,	  and	  expulsion	  of	  the	  non-­‐
                                                
16  Joint  FAO /WHO standards programme. Consideration of the impact of private standards, CX/CAC/10/33/13, 2010,  
FAO 2011, Private standards and certification in fisheries and aquaculture, Current practice and emerging issues, FAO Spencer 
Henson & John Humphrey, The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting 
Processes , Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 09/32/9D-Part II 
(2009), OECD, Final report on private standards and the shaping of the agro-food system, 2006. 
17  In this context, conflict resolution is a much broader concept than dispute settlements. The focus is on the former. For 
a more specific analysis of dispute settlements and enforcement in TPR, see FABRIZIO CAFAGGI (ed.) THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION (Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2011).  
18  See on the relationship between regulatory strategies and contractual forms F. Cafaggi, Transnational governance by 
contract. Private regulation and contractual networks in food safety, available on ssrn 
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compliant	  regulatees	  (related	  to	  exit	  from	  the	  regulatory	  regime)	  which	  complement	  





Conflicts	  and	  Micro-­‐Governance	  
	  
TPR	  is	  based	  on	  private	  law	  models,	  primarily	  organizations	  and	  contracts	  and	  the	  
different	  regulatory	  regimes	  choose	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  two	  depending	  primarily	  on	  how	  
the	  private	  sphere	  in	  the	  specific	  sector	  is	  composed.	  In	  fact	  the	  private	  sphere	  within	  TPR	  
is	  quite	  diverse	  and	  presents	  various	  features.	  Private	  actors	  include	  MNCs,	  industry	  and	  
trade	  associations,	  NGOs,	  law	  firms,	  expert	  groups	  and	  different	  types	  of	  epistemic	  
communities20.	  Often	  their	  preferences	  and	  incentives	  amongst	  regulatory	  outputs	  vary	  
and	  can	  conflict.	  Variations	  may	  depend	  on	  the	  market	  structure	  within	  which	  they	  operate	  
and	  on	  the	  level	  of	  trade	  integration	  of	  the	  regulated	  firms	  but	  also	  on	  strategic	  
considerations	  to	  enhance	  their	  bargaining	  power.	  When,	  for	  example,	  markets	  are	  highly	  
concentrated	  the	  incentives	  of	  incumbent	  market	  players	  are	  generally	  aligned	  and	  
conflicts	  might	  arise	  with	  trade	  associations	  or	  NGOs.	  For	  instance	  often	  global	  enterprises	  
call	  for	  uniform	  regimes,	  while	  national	  trade	  associations	  privilege	  local	  regulation	  in	  
order	  to	  preserve	  the	  strength	  of	  national	  champions	  and	  their	  own	  local	  regulatory	  power.	  
When	  market	  concentration	  is	  lower,	  conflicts	  occur	  among	  regulated	  entities,	  which	  often	  
make	  alliances	  with	  beneficiaries	  (NGOs)	  against	  other	  regulated	  entities.	  A	  typical	  
illustration	  is	  the	  conflict	  between	  MNC	  and	  SMEs	  as	  to	  the	  goals	  and	  costs	  of	  private	  
regulation	  and	  who	  should	  bear	  the	  latter	  along	  the	  supply	  chain.	  In	  trade	  and	  food	  safety,	  
NGOs	  and	  SMEs	  are	  frequently	  allied	  ‘against’	  MNCs	  to	  increase	  the	  fairness	  of	  trade	  and	  to	  
redistribute	  costs	  of	  private	  regimes21.	  
	  
The	  regulatory	  relationship	  allows	  us	  also	  to	  describe	  the	  different	  interests	  of	  private	  
parties	  and	  how	  the	  governance	  of	  private	  organizations	  changes	  when	  (1)	  regulators	  and	  
the	  regulated	  coincide,	  or	  (2)	  when	  regulators	  and	  beneficiaries	  coincide,	  while	  regulators	  
and	  the	  regulated	  differ.	  
	  
The	  first	  three	  models	  set	  out	  below	  represent	  different	  architectures	  depending	  upon	  how	  
interests	  among	  the	  regulated	  and	  between	  the	  regulated	  and	  beneficiaries	  are	  aligned.	  The	  
fourth	  model,	  conventionally	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  expertise,	  is	  used	  when	  delegation	  by	  
private	  regulators	  to	  technical	  bodies	  provides	  a	  more	  effective	  solution	  for	  solving	  
conflicts	  among	  stakeholders.	  
	  
                                                
19  Id., supra note 18. 
20  David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI., 261 (2008); Levi-Faur, supra note 5; Abbot 
& Snidal, supra note 1; Buthe, supra note 1. 
21             See G. Gereffi and others,  
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(1) In	  a	  first	  model,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  regulator	  and	  those	  of	  the	  regulated	  are	  
aligned,	  while	  the	  beneficiaries	  are	  kept	  out	  of	  the	  legal	  boundaries	  of	  the	  
organization.	  Conflicts	  concern	  primarily	  the	  relationship	  between	  regulatees	  
and	  beneficiaries.	  The	  beneficiaries	  are	  not	  members	  of	  the	  regulatory	  body.	  
They	  might	  not	  have	  any	  legal	  protection	  or	  hold	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  rights.	  For	  
example	  they	  might	  be	  given	  procedural	  rights	  to	  participate	  or	  to	  access	  review,	  
either	  internal	  or	  judicial22.	  This	  is	  still	  the	  model	  for	  the	  International	  Chamber	  
of	  Commerce	  (ICC)	  one	  of	  the	  eldest	  contemporary	  global	  standard	  setter.	  This	  
was	  also	  the	  case	  in	  many	  corporate	  social	  responsibility	  (CSR)	  instruments	  
where	  firms	  or	  industries	  drafted	  codes	  of	  conduct	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  various,	  
often	  conflicting	  stakeholders	  without	  their	  direct	  involvement23.	  Many	  of	  the	  
CSR	  regimes	  have	  now	  shifted	  into	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model.	  The	  governance	  
design	  needs	  to	  accommodate	  accountability	  requirements	  to	  beneficiaries	  
external	  to	  the	  organization	  but	  affected	  by	  the	  regulation.	  Procedural	  
accountability	  contributes	  to	  acquire	  information	  about	  adverse	  impact	  of	  
private	  regulation	  and	  to	  address	  potential	  conflicts.	  
	  
(2) In	  a	  second	  model,	  beneficiaries	  become	  the	  regulators:	  the	  regulator	  is	  a	  single	  
NGO	  or	  a	  coalition	  of	  NGOs,	  while	  the	  regulated	  are	  the	  firms.	  Here	  conflicts	  arise	  
between	  the	  regulator	  and	  the	  regulatees	  since	  typically	  their	  interests	  are	  not	  
aligned.	  This	  model	  is	  often	  adopted	  in	  the	  area	  of	  certification,	  where	  the	  
regulator-­‐NGO	  accredits	  bodies	  that	  certify	  the	  conformity	  of	  products	  and/or	  
services	  with	  the	  rules	  enacted	  by	  the	  regulator.	  
	  
Unlike	  the	  previous	  model,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  relationship	  between	  regulators	  and	  regulatees	  
is	  contractual	  rather	  than	  organizational.	  
	  
Where	  do	  beneficiaries	  acquire	  authority	  over	  regulatees?	  Firms	  voluntarily	  subscribe	  to	  
these	  regimes	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  market	  and	  social	  pressures	  and	  commit	  to	  the	  rules	  via	  
contract	  rather	  than	  membership.	  Their	  interests	  are	  aligned	  through	  market	  
accountability	  mechanisms.	  The	  beneficiaries	  may	  coincide	  with	  constituencies	  
represented	  by	  the	  NGOs	  in	  the	  governing	  board	  of	  the	  regulator	  or	  may	  reflect	  a	  broader	  
range	  of	  interests	  than	  those	  represented	  in	  the	  governing	  body.	  In	  the	  latter	  case	  there	  
might	  be	  some	  misalignment	  between	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  regulator	  and	  the	  full	  group	  of	  
beneficiaries.	  	  
	  
Case	  (1)	  resembles	  traditional	  self-­‐regulation,	  although	  the	  active	  role	  of	  beneficiaries	  in	  
the	  process	  constitutes	  a	  significant	  departure	  from	  it.	  Case	  (2)	  refers	  to	  an	  NGO-­‐driven	  
private	  regulator	  defining	  and	  monitoring	  the	  compliance	  with	  rules	  by	  regulated	  firms,	  as	  
                                                
22  Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 – 
108 (2005); Id. Instrument Choice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW , 147 (Daniel 
Bodansky, et al, eds., 2007). 
23  See John Ruggie, 2011, Guiding principles on business and human rights: Implementing the United Nations Protect, 
Respect and Remedy framework, endorsed by UN on june 16 2011. 
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in	  many	  certification	  regimes24.	  This	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  original	  form	  of	  private	  
regulation	  compared	  to	  traditional	  self-­‐regulation.	  	  (3)	  In	  a	  third	  model,	  regulatees	  and	  
beneficiaries	  merge	  into	  a	  single	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  regulator.	  	  In	  order	  to	  solve	  conflicts	  of	  
interests	  between	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  more	  inclusive	  regulatory	  bodies	  have	  been	  
generated.	  They	  can	  take	  either	  the	  form	  of	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  organization	  or	  that	  of	  a	  
multiparty	  agreement.	  A	  wide	  variety	  of	  regimes	  combines	  the	  two	  features,	  adopting	  a	  
multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  where	  members	  of	  the	  regulatory	  body	  are	  both	  representatives	  
of	  the	  regulated,	  the	  beneficiaries	  and	  of	  other	  constituencies	  affected	  by	  the	  regulatory	  
process.	  
	  
Merger	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict	  but	  it	  may	  contribute	  to	  its	  solution.	  It	  should	  be	  
clarified	  that	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  are	  manifold.	  In	  fact	  the	  presence	  
of	  multiple	  stakeholders	  can	  be	  determined	  by	  many	  concurring	  factors:	  	  the	  incentives	  to	  
reduce	  conflicts	  and	  increase	  cooperation,	  the	  necessity	  to	  increase	  legitimacy	  by	  
representing	  different	  interests,	  and	  the	  combination	  of	  different	  cognitive	  abilities	  and	  
expertise25.	  	  
	  
The	  role	  of	  governance	  in	  this	  third	  model	  is	  very	  delicate	  since	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  regulated	  and	  the	  beneficiaries	  will	  be	  balanced	  depend	  on	  formal	  and	  
informal	  rules	  concerning	  both	  the	  organizations	  and	  the	  activity.	  This	  is	  always	  the	  case	  
but	  in	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  the	  role	  of	  informal	  rules	  tend	  to	  increase.	  The	  inclusion	  
of	  multiple	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  governing	  body	  reduces	  conflicts	  and	  induces	  cooperation,	  
albeit	  increasing	  transaction	  costs.	  	  
	  
Unlike	  the	  case	  of	  macro-­‐governance,	  judicial	  interventions	  are	  rare	  in	  micro-­‐governance	  
whereas	  conflicts	  are	  solved	  by	  reference	  to	  internal	  dispute	  resolution	  mechanisms.	  Thus,	  
in	  order	  to	  address	  uncertainty,	  governance	  rules	  concerning	  the	  activity	  rather	  than	  the	  
organization	  might	  be	  necessary.	  Multi-­‐stakeholder	  organizations	  transfer	  the	  burden	  of	  
tackling	  uncertainty	  onto	  the	  procedural	  side	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  Forest	  Stewardship	  
Council	  (	  FSC)	  constitutes	  a	  good	  example.	  They	  govern	  the	  certification	  process	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  10	  principles	  but	  delegate	  the	  ‘important’	  conflict	  resolution	  to	  accredited	  bodies	  
which	  have	  to	  certify	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  those	  principles	  and	  additional	  rules.	  Another	  example	  
in	  the	  financial	  market	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  International	  Swaps	  and	  derivatives	  
associayion	  (ISDA),	  where	  a	  variety	  of	  interest	  groups	  is	  represented	  with	  a	  leading	  role	  of	  
financial	  institutions	  and	  law	  firms.	  
	  
(4)	  An	  additional,	  fourth	  model	  of	  transnational	  private	  regulators	  is	  that	  led	  by	  experts.	  
References	  are	  generally	  made	  to	  those	  organizations	  producing	  technical	  standards:	  the	  
most	  common	  example	  is	  that	  of	  the	  International	  Standard	  Organization	  (ISO).	  Delegation	  
                                                
24 It should be clarified that there are also certification regimes which are business driven when professional bodies 
certify compliance with private or even public rules. This is the case of credit rating agencies, accounting and professional 
services. 
25  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1. 
13                         THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION	  
of	  rule	  –making	  to	  experts	  may	  constitute	  an	  attempt	  to	  neutralize	  behind	  science	  and	  
expertise	  the	  conflicts.	  Expert	  models	  however	  are	  not	  insulated	  from	  the	  regulatory	  
relationship.	  Attempts	  to	  involve	  stakeholders	  into	  the	  standard	  setting	  process	  have	  been	  
increasingly	  yet	  not	  entirely	  successful.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  ISO	  has	  progressively	  
incorporated	  social	  and	  environmental	  concerns	  in	  its	  technical	  standardization	  process;	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  has	  moved	  from	  product	  to	  process	  standards	  and	  increasingly	  into	  
the	  field	  of	  corporate	  management	  including	  CSR,	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ISO	  26000.	  
This	  process	  has	  been	  clearly	  influenced	  by	  the	  increasing	  role	  of	  beneficiaries	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  technical	  standardization	  which	  used	  to	  be	  (to	  some	  extent	  still	  is!)	  primarily	  
driven	  by	  the	  interests	  of	  regulatees.	  	  
	  
Comparative	  table	  of	  regulatory	  models	  	  
	  
	   	  Model	  1	   	   	  Model	  2	   	  Model	  3	   Model	  4	  






NGOs	  and	  expert	  
representatives)	  
Expert	  body	  
Regulatees	   firms	   firms	   firms	   firms	  
Beneficiaries	   NGOs	   NGOs	   NGOs	   NGOs	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  simplify	  the	  illustration	  of	  conflicts	  and	  how	  they	  are	  governed,	  regulatees	  and	  
beneficiaries	  have	  been	  held	  constant,	  while	  regulators	  have	  changed.	  Clearly	  in	  the	  real	  
world	  each	  organization	  has	  different	  classes	  of	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  whose	  
interests	  may	  be	  conflicting,	  giving	  rise	  to	  more	  complex	  models	  where	  conflicts	  within	  
categories	  add	  to	  conflicts	  between	  them.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  table	  is	  to	  show	  how	  the	  identity	  
of	  private	  regulators	  changes	  and	  which	  consequences	  might	  have	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  
conflicting	  interests	  with	  the	  two	  main	  categories	  of	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries.	  
	  
The	  four	  models	  show	  the	  necessity	  to	  correlate	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  conflicting	  interests	  with	  
the	  governance	  solution.	  Different	  conflicts	  give	  rise	  to	  different	  models.	  The	  governance	  
model	  depends	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  regulatory	  relationship	  between	  regulators,	  
regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries.	  Clearly	  the	  organizational	  dimension,	  in	  particular	  how	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  the	  organizations	  are	  designed,	  how	  membership	  is	  defined,	  which	  private	  
rights	  are	  given	  to	  non-­‐members,	  are	  all	  relevant	  issues.	  However,	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  effects	  
of	  the	  regulation	  and	  its	  scope	  determine	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  the	  




In	  the	  macro-­‐governance	  framework	  interests	  are	  represented	  by	  conflicting	  organizations	  
thereby	  moving	  from	  intra	  to	  inter-­‐organizational	  conflicts.	  While	  consumer	  protection	  in	  
micro-­‐governance	  is	  ensured	  by	  litigation	  in	  the	  first	  model	  or	  by	  participating	  into	  a	  
multistakeholder	  organization	  in	  the	  third	  model,	  here	  consumers	  define	  their	  own	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transnational	  rules	  and	  try	  to	  ‘induce’	  firms	  to	  comply	  with	  them.	  For	  example	  NGOs,	  
instead	  of	  seeking	  representation	  in	  business-­‐driven	  regulatory	  bodies	  create	  their	  own	  
organizations	  that,	  primarily	  via	  certification,	  affect	  firms’	  conduct	  and	  choices.	  Often,	  in	  
response,	  new	  business	  organizations	  are	  created	  to	  counteract	  NGO-­‐led	  organizations	  and	  
operate	  in	  the	  area	  of	  certification.	  Forestry	  and	  fair	  trade	  are	  good	  illustrations	  of	  this	  
pattern.	  	  
In	  macro-­‐governance	  the	  relationships	  between	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  but	  also	  
among	  various	  regulatees	  move	  from	  the	  intra-­‐	  to	  inter-­‐organizational	  dimension.	  This	  
occurs	  both	  at	  the	  level	  of	  (1)	  a	  single	  regime,	  where	  multiple	  organizations	  coexist,	  and	  (2)	  
that	  of	  multiple	  regimes	  where	  different	  policy	  goals,	  promoted	  by	  each	  regime,	  
correspond	  to	  a	  category	  of	  regulatees	  or	  beneficiaries.	  
	  
The	  focus	  is	  on	  two	  different	  yet	  related	  issues	  of	  transnational	  governance:	  	  
1) coordination	  and	  competition	  among	  private	  regulators	  within	  the	  same	  regime:	  
when	  two	  or	  more	  organizations	  regulate	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  same	  potential	  
pool	  of	  regulatees	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  same	  field	  (CSR,	  environment,	  finance,	  
banking,	  internet,	  e-­‐commerce);	  
2) coordination	  and	  competition	  among	  different	  regimes	  including	  both	  private	  
and	  public	  ones	  (trade	  and	  environment,	  environment	  and	  consumer,	  consumer	  





A	  regime	  is	  a	  regulatory	  space	  defined	  by	  a	  policy	  field	  and	  populated	  by	  one	  or	  multiple	  
regulators26.	  Its	  boundaries	  are	  functionally	  determined	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  policy	  field	  and	  
its	  goals:	  for	  example,	  in	  an	  advertising	  regime	  the	  goals	  are	  to	  promote	  fair	  and	  
responsible	  commercial	  practices	  to	  inform	  consumers.	  The	  governance	  dimension	  here	  
concerns	  the	  relationship	  among	  regulators	  representing	  different	  components	  of	  the	  
regulatory	  chain	  within	  a	  single	  regime,	  unlike	  micro-­‐governance	  where	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  
single	  components	  of	  the	  regulatory	  relationship.	  The	  regulatory	  chain	  within	  a	  regime	  is	  
composed	  by	  the	  set	  of	  organizations	  concurring	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  rules	  and	  more	  
broadly	  to	  the	  regulatory	  process.	  Multiple	  organizations	  characterize	  for	  example	  the	  
payment	  system:	  there	  is	  a	  global	  organization,	  International	  payment	  Framework	  (IPF);	  
secondly	  a	  European	  organization	  which	  is	  heavily	  involved	  in	  consolidating	  the	  Euro	  
payment	  system	  SEPA	  called	  European	  Payment	  Council	  (EPC)	  and	  thirdly	  national	  
organizations,	  primarily	  banking	  associations,	  in	  charge	  of	  implementation	  of	  standards	  set	  
by	  the	  two	  supranational	  organizations.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  regulation	  is	  the	  relationship	  
between	  banks	  to	  ensure	  interoperability	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  relationship	  between	  banks	  
and	  customers.	  Often	  the	  conflicts	  emerge	  in	  the	  vertical	  space	  between	  national	  banking	  
associations	  and	  the	  European	  or	  global	  level,	  where	  the	  big	  banking	  conglomerates	  
                                                
26              The views on what a regime is are numerous and vary across social sciences. References are too 
voluminous to be summarized here. 
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operate.	  Conflicting	  views	  are	  related	  to	  when	  and	  how	  an	  integrated	  payment	  system	  
should	  be	  in	  place,	  which	  category	  should	  pay	  the	  costs	  of	  integration	  and	  how	  the	  benefits	  
should	  be	  allocated27.	  Thence	  regulatory	  conflicts	  concern	  both	  the	  different	  components	  of	  
the	  banking	  systems,	  the	  customers,	  both	  firms	  and	  consumers,	  which	  can	  be	  considered	  
regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  in	  the	  payment	  system.	  
More	  complex	  patterns	  of	  conflicts	  within	  regimes	  exist	  in	  the	  field	  of	  food	  safety	  where	  
regional	  retailers’	  organizations	  have	  competed	  over	  standard	  setting.	  They	  include	  
retailers	  based	  associations	  BRC	  (a	  British-­‐Dutch),	  IFS	  (a	  Franco-­‐German)	  QFS	  (an	  
Australian	  and	  North	  American)	  but	  also	  pan-­‐European,	  later	  become	  global,	  organizations	  
like	  Global-­‐gap,	  (former	  Euro-­‐gap),	  and	  Global	  food	  safety	  initiative	  (GFSI)28.	  Here	  the	  
conflicts	  concern	  retailers,	  the	  relationship	  between	  retailers	  and	  suppliers	  and	  that	  
between	  the	  participants	  to	  the	  supply	  chain	  and	  the	  final	  consumers	  of	  foodstuff.	  
	  
Within	  regimes	  the	  amount	  of	  standards	  may	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  number	  of	  standard	  
setters	  which	  depends	  on	  the	  power	  balance	  among	  different	  constituencies.	  Increasingly	  
after	  a	  period	  of	  strong	  and	  sometimes	  disruptive	  competition,	  we	  observe	  the	  efforts	  of	  
cooperation	  among	  private	  regulators	  both	  in	  relation	  to	  standard	  setting	  and	  monitoring.	  
Regulatory	  contracts	  are	  increasingly	  adopted	  between	  private	  and	  public	  regulators	  in	  the	  
area	  of	  rule	  making,	  monitoring	  and	  compliance.	  These	  occur	  between	  private	  and	  public	  
actors,	  for	  example	  between	  IO	  and	  private	  organizations,	  or	  between	  single	  states	  and	  
MNC.	  Regulatory	  contracts	  and	  MoU	  can	  also	  focus	  on	  monitoring	  compliance,	  such	  as	  
those	  signed	  by	  certifiers	  in	  accounting,	  forestry,	  food	  safety29.	  	  
	  
When	  regimes	  are	  composed	  by	  many	  organizations	  that	  can	  cooperate	  and/or	  compete,	  
they	  pose	  governance	  questions	  different	  from	  those	  featuring	  a	  leading	  uncontested	  
institution	  or	  an	  oligopolistic	  regime.	  In	  the	  monopolist	  model	  accountability	  is	  primarily	  
ensured	  through	  voice	  and	  loyalty;	  in	  the	  pluralist	  model,	  where	  exit	  is	  available	  at	  
relatively	  low	  costs,	  competition	  and	  market	  accountability	  play	  a	  more	  significant	  role30.	  
Often	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  different	  regulators	  emerge	  and	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  move	  from	  the	  
organizational	  to	  the	  regime	  levels.	  Thence	  conflicts	  among	  regulatees	  or	  between	  them	  
and	  beneficiaries	  do	  not	  take	  place	  within	  the	  organization	  but	  among	  organizations.	  
	  
Public	  entities	  both	  at	  the	  global	  and	  regional	  level	  do	  have	  leverage	  on	  how	  conflicts	  are	  
governed	  in	  private	  regulation	  even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  directly	  participate	  into	  the	  regime.	  The	  
governance	  of	  the	  regime	  is	  formally	  private	  but	  heavily	  or	  at	  least	  significantly	  influenced	  
by	  public	  institutions.	  Often	  public	  institutions	  both	  at	  international	  and	  domestic	  levels	  
push	  to	  include	  beneficiaries’	  interests	  into	  the	  standard	  setting	  and	  enforcement	  activities	  
threatening	  public	  legislation	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  private	  regulation.	  The	  threat	  almost	  
never	  consists	  of	  a	  new	  Treaty.	  Rather	  it	  is	  regional	  (European	  for	  example)	  legislation	  
with	  some	  likelihood	  of	  spreading	  across	  states’	  boundaries.	  	  
                                                
27              See EPC 2010, the Regulation Proposal of December 2010 modified by EU Parliament 2011. 
28              See FAO/WHO Consideration of the Impact of Private Standards, CX/CAC 10/33/13 (5-9 July, 2010). 
29  See for example the MOU between IASCF and the financial authorities, the MOU between FSC and LEI in the field of 
forestry certification or that between GlobalGAP (Foodplus) and IAP in food quality and safety certification. 
30  On the role of competition for regulatory shares in transnational governance, see Black, supra note 1.  
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Macro-­‐Governance	  -­‐	  Multiple	  Regimes	  	  
	  
The	  third	  dimension	  of	  governance	  analysis	  concerns	  the	  relationship	  among	  regimes	  
pursuing	  different,	  often	  conflicting,	  policy	  objectives.	  	  
A	  single	  industrial	  activity	  like	  agriculture	  or	  manufacture	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  many	  
regulatory	  regimes	  from	  human	  rights	  to	  environmental	  protection,	  from	  product	  safety	  to	  
biodiversity,	  from	  free	  trade	  to	  consumer	  protection.	  The	  same	  regulatee,	  a	  firm,	  is	  
therefore	  simultaneously	  regulated	  by	  multiple	  private	  regulatory	  regimes	  functionally	  
interdependent,	  representing	  different	  beneficiaries’	  interests.	  Functional	  regimes’	  
interdependence	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  production	  of	  the	  same	  or	  overlapping	  global	  
collective	  goods	  via	  multiple	  rules	  or	  to	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  interconnected	  risks	  (i.e.	  product	  
safety	  and	  environmental	  protection)	  through	  multiple	  concurring	  regimes.	  Conflicts	  arise	  
thence	  not	  only	  within,	  but	  also	  among	  regimes.	  Insufficiently	  protected	  interests	  within	  
one	  regime	  sometimes	  contribute	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  regimes	  as	  a	  reaction,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  fair	  trade	  regime	  as	  a	  response	  to	  (supposedly	  unfair)	  free	  trade	  rules.	  	  
	  
Sector	  specificity,	  embedded	  in	  separate	  and	  independent	  regimes,	  implies	  that	  the	  same	  
norm	  can	  be	  compliant	  with	  one	  system	  but	  can	  constitute	  a	  violation	  of	  another31.	  For	  
example,	  a	  trade	  rule	  may	  be	  compliant	  with	  WTO	  rules	  but	  being	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  UN	  
Global	  Compact,	  or	  an	  ILO	  Convention	  or	  OECD	  Guidelines	  on	  multinational	  corporations,	  
representing	  the	  interests	  of	  beneficiaries.	  An	  environmental	  norm	  may	  lower	  emissions	  
but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  violate	  free	  trade	  principles.	  Environmental	  private	  regimes	  may	  often	  
include	  trade-­‐restrictive	  measures	  where	  for	  example	  import	  bans	  are	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  protection	  of	  endangered	  species32	  	  or	  on	  compliance	  with	  the	  precautionary	  principle33.	  
An	  e-­‐commerce	  rule	  may	  favour	  free	  trade	  but	  violate	  data	  protection	  or	  privacy	  rights	  of	  
the	  traders.	  
	  
Regulatory	  activities	  within	  one	  regime	  can	  thence	  affect	  (undermine)	  policies	  pursued	  by	  
other	  regimes.	  The	  search	  for	  autonomy	  of	  legal	  orders	  should	  not	  neglect	  regimes’	  
interdependences,	  especially	  related	  to	  the	  integration	  of	  policies	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  
conflicting	  goals	  will	  have	  to	  be	  balanced34.	  Interdependences	  may	  not	  only	  require	  
                                                
31  Francesco Francioni, Environment, Human Rights and the Limits of Free Trade, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 -26 (FRANCESCO FRANCIONI , ed., 2001);  Joost Pauwelyn, Fragmentation of International Law, MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006), 
http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e1406&recno=1&searchType=Quick&query=Fragmentation. 
32   Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, DS58/AB/R 
(Oct. 12, 1998). 
33  Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R,, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
34  Technically the degree of interdependence depends on the scope of jurisdiction when conflicts have to be solved by 
judicial intervention. If a Court defines the scope broadly it will see the individual regime in relation to other regimes and or 
17                         THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION	  
coordination	  but	  also	  conflict	  resolution35.	  In	  the	  domain	  of	  TPR,	  formal	  hierarchy	  does	  not	  
exist	  and	  regimes	  themselves	  have	  to	  define	  solutions	  to	  potential	  collisions.	  Private	  
organizations	  or	  contractual	  networks	  cannot	  unilaterally	  impose	  obligations	  on	  other	  
networks	  or	  on	  private	  organizations	  in	  order	  to	  define	  which	  rule	  prevails	  in	  case	  of	  
conflict.	  De	  jure	  they	  can	  only	  consent	  to	  obligations,	  limiting	  their	  freedom	  to	  enhance	  the	  
protection	  of	  interests	  pursued	  through	  different	  regimes.	  Unlike	  micro-­‐governance,	  which	  
primarily	  uses	  organizational	  tools,	  macro-­‐governance	  solves	  conflicts	  predominantly	  
through	  regulatory	  contracts	  among	  regimes	  or	  via	  judicial	  intervention.	  In	  micro-­‐
governance	  different	  constituencies	  co-­‐exist	  in	  the	  same	  organization,	  for	  example	  an	  
association,	  and	  solve	  their	  conflicts	  by	  deliberating	  in	  the	  general	  meeting	  or	  the	  board.	  In	  
macro-­‐governance	  the	  legal	  independence	  of	  regimes	  reflect	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  different	  
constituencies.	  They	  do	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  organization	  and	  have	  to	  use	  contracts	  or	  
functional	  equivalents	  to	  address	  and	  settle	  conflicts.	  However	  as	  repeatedly	  said	  legal	  
independence	  can	  not	  neglect	  policies	  interdependences	  and	  conflicts.	  
	  
The	  regulatory	  relationship	  is	  here	  broken	  down	  into	  different	  regimes,	  rather	  than	  into	  
organizations,	  characterized	  by	  interdependence.	  Different	  classes	  of	  regulatees	  and	  
beneficiaries	  create	  their	  own	  regimes	  i.e.	  human	  rights,	  environmental,	  labour,	  consumer	  
protection36.	  But	  these	  regimes	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  different	  categories	  within	  the	  
same	  regulatory	  relationship.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier	  the	  same	  firm	  is	  simultaneously	  subject	  
to	  multiple	  often	  conflicting	  regulatory	  regimes.	  The	  creation	  of	  new	  regimes	  and	  new	  
fields	  reflects	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  transformation	  process	  of	  the	  regulatory	  relationship	  
while,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  increases	  normative	  fragmentation	  and	  conflicts.	  For	  instance	  by	  
moving	  from	  the	  position	  of	  beneficiaries	  to	  that	  of	  regulators	  via	  creation	  of	  new	  regimes,	  
NGOs	  try	  changing	  the	  distribution	  of	  rule-­‐making	  power	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
regulatory	  relationship.	  The	  possibility	  to	  change	  the	  power	  balance	  depends	  on	  the	  
recognition	  or	  the	  denial	  of	  policy	  interdependency	  among	  different	  regimes.	  This	  is	  what	  
is	  at	  stake	  when	  regimes’	  conflicts	  arise.	  
	  
The	  final	  part	  of	  the	  essay	  focuses	  only	  on	  two	  families	  of	  regime-­‐coordination	  mechanisms	  
that	  use	  or	  affect	  macro	  governance:	  ex	  ante	  regulatory	  coordination,	  and/or	  ex	  post	  
judicial	  coordination.	  This	  distinction	  highlights	  two	  important	  aspects:	  regulatory	  
coordination	  and	  conflicts	  among	  regimes	  may	  have	  different	  features	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
standard	  setting,	  and	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  implementation	  and	  enforcement.	  Modes	  of	  
implementation,	  often	  in	  the	  remit	  of	  different	  players	  from	  those	  who	  have	  designed	  the	  
regime,	  may	  generate	  or	  reduce	  conflicts	  that	  were	  anticipated	  at	  the	  drafting	  stage.	  
Spelling	  out	  the	  distinction	  should	  not	  lead	  to	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  no	  link	  between	  
contractual	  and	  judicial	  governance.	  On	  the	  contrary	  the	  development	  of	  transnational	  
devices	  to	  solve	  conflicts	  increases	  the	  role	  of	  judicial	  intervention	  since	  often	  regulatory	  
                                                                                                                                                       
international law; if a Court defines it narrowly it will not engage in a systematic interpretation but for reference to general 
international law.   
35  S. Cassese, 2009, Il diritto globale, Einaudi, Torino passim, Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: 
Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders', 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 373 (2008); Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking 
Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 415, 442 (2008). 
36  Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The vain search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J.INT’L L. 999 (2004). 
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contracts	  to	  coordinate	  different	  regimes	  are	  incomplete	  and	  ex	  post	  gap	  filling	  turns	  out	  to	  




    
Governance	  and	  ex	  ante	  regulatory	  coordination	  
 
Regimes’	  cooperation	  is	  a	  very	  broad	  field	  whose	  boundaries	  are	  still	  uncertain37.	  In	  this	  
essay	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  regulatory	  cooperation	  as	  a	  response	  to	  conflicts	  which	  can	  occur	  
when	  overlapping	  scope	  of	  different	  regimes	  exist.	  Cooperation	  may	  be	  directed	  at	  
preventing	  conflicts	  by	  partitioning	  ex	  ante	  the	  regulatory	  space	  or	  by	  giving	  Courts	  the	  
power	  to	  define	  ex	  post	  the	  boundaries	  among	  regimes.	  Incentives	  to	  cooperate	  may	  
emerge	  for	  different	  reasons	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  is	  only	  one	  of	  them.	  	  
	  
Transnational	  regulatory	  coordination	  deploys	  transactional	  instruments	  like	  
regulatory	  framework	  contracts,	  memoranda	  of	  understanding,	  codes	  of	  practice,	  
individual	  clauses	  or	  decentralized	  market	  based	  mechanisms	  to	  coordinate	  and/or	  solve	  
conflicts	  among	  regimes	  representing	  divergent	  interests	  related	  to	  the	  same	  economic	  
activity.	  Private	  regimes	  face	  similar	  problems	  to	  those	  investigated	  in	  the	  public	  domain,	  
but	  the	  differences	  with	  public	  international	  law	  are	  remarkable	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
instruments	  deployed	  to	  solve	  coordination	  problems	  and	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  agreements38.	  	  
In	  the	  brief	  description	  that	  follows,	  two	  ex	  ante	  governance	  responses	  are	  analyzed:	  (A)	  
coordination	  and	  (B)	  integration.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  coordination	  the	  regulatory	  relationship	  
remains	  broken	  into	  different	  regimes;	  in	  integration	  (like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  
organizations	  for	  micro-­‐governance)	  it	  moves	  from	  multiple	  to	  single	  regimes	  resulting	  in	  a	  
different	  type	  of	  macro-­‐governance.	  
	  
(A) Coordination.	  Within	  coordination	  one	  should	  distinguish	  between	  (I)	  
centralized	  responses,	  where	  regimes’	  coordination	  is	  operationalized	  by	  the	  
regulators,	  and	  (II)	  decentralized	  responses	  when	  coordination	  is	  
operationalized	  by	  the	  regulatees	  through	  choice	  of	  applicable	  rules	  (private	  
international	  law	  or	  functional	  equivalents).	  	  
(AI)	  Centralized	  mechanisms.	  	  Within	  these	  mechanisms	  we	  distinguish	  between	  
procedural	  and	  substantive	  coordination.	  	  
(1) procedural	  coordination:	  MoUs	  or	  regulatory	  contracts	  can	  regulate	  
consultation	  or	  governance	  participation,	  i.e.	  the	  presence	  of	  observers	  in	  each	  
other’s	  governing	  bodies,	  or	  the	  creation	  of	  common	  fora.	  Some	  regimes	  require	  
                                                
37 See the paragraph on international regulatory competition in OECD draft recommendations on regulatory policy 
and governance may 25 2011.  
38   For instance, the application of rules like lex posterior derogat priori or lex specialis derogat  generali to a conflict 
between two private regimes regulated by contracts might not be appropriate.  
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that	  consultation	  takes	  place	  before	  a	  regulatory	  instrument	  comes	  into	  force;	  
others	  provide	  for	  the	  right	  to	  be	  heard	  and	  to	  comment.	  	  
(2) substantive	  coordination:	  regulatory	  contracts	  or	  MoUs	  can	  address	  conflicts	  
by	  designing	  clauses	  that	  connect	  or	  disconnect	  regimes,	  ensuring	  
compatibility39.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  underline	  that	  both	  connection	  and	  
disconnection	  can	  ensure	  regimes’	  coordination.	  Exiting	  from	  an	  environmental	  
regime	  to	  ensure	  free	  trade	  is	  a	  way	  of	  connecting	  two	  conflicting	  regimes	  and	  
decide	  that	  free	  trade	  must	  have	  priority.	  Connecting	  clauses	  include	  different	  
mechanisms	  from	  direct	  incorporation,	  incorporation	  by	  reference,	  conforming	  
interpretation,	  opt-­‐in.	  Disconnecting	  clauses	  ensure	  opt-­‐out	  which	  can	  be	  partial	  
or	  total,	  referring	  to	  a	  specific	  aspect	  or	  a	  to	  a	  general	  one40.	  These	  coordination	  
mechanisms	  may	  pursue	  different	  goals:	  regulate	  interdependencies	  by	  
ensuring	  consistency,	  regulating	  boundaries,	  establishing	  conditionality,	  or	  
solve	  conflicts	  by	  defining	  hierarchies	  or	  bargaining	  procedures	  to	  reach	  case	  by	  
case	  solutions.	  These	  include	  international	  framework	  contracts,	  MoUs,	  
guidelines,	  unilateral	  acts	  and	  conflict	  clauses.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (AII)	  Decentralized	  mechanisms.	  Two	  mechanisms	  illustrate	  the	  different	  
operational	  structure	  based	  on	  the	  regulatory	  relationship	  (1)	  mutual	  
recognition,	  governed	  by	  agreements	  among	  regulators,	  and	  (2)	  choice	  of	  law,	  
governed	  by	  choices	  of	  regulatees	  or	  beneficiaries.	  	  
(1) Mutual	  recognition	  is	  well	  known	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  both	  at	  the	  regional	  
and	  global	  levels.	  It	  can	  refer	  to	  rules	  and/or	  to	  judgments.	  It	  consists	  of	  
principles	  and	  rules	  defining	  functional	  regulatory	  equivalence	  among	  multiple	  
regimes.	  It	  is	  growing	  in	  the	  field	  of	  certification	  where	  private	  certifiers	  have	  
created	  meta	  organizations	  that	  define	  the	  principles	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  (for	  
example	  in	  the	  case	  of	  food	  safety	  GFSI).	  
(2) Choice	  of	  applicable	  law	  consists	  of	  clauses	  defining	  which	  regime	  should	  
prevail	  in	  the	  case	  of	  conflict.	  In	  this	  instance	  it	  would	  be	  a	  not	  territorially,	  as	  is	  
usually	  the	  case	  in	  conflict	  of	  laws,	  but	  a	  functionally	  defined	  regime.	  These	  
rules	  can	  give	  regulatees	  and	  or	  beneficiaries	  the	  power	  to	  opt-­‐in	  or	  to	  opt-­‐out.	  
An	  example	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  recent	  Online	  behavioural	  advertising	  (OBA)	  
regime	  where	  data	  protection	  and	  advertising	  can	  come	  into	  conflict.	  Codes	  give	  
the	  user	  the	  power	  to	  opt-­‐out	  the	  advertising	  regime	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  her	  
privacy41.	  	  
	  
                                                
39            See for examples MoU between ISO and ILO, between ISO and OECD, between ISO and UN Global 
Compact where clauses are introduced subjecting standards setting by ISO to backing by the other organizations and 
in case of disagreement  
40  See on disconnecting clauses in the domain of external relations. 
41  See European Self-Regulation for Online Behavioural Advertising, IAB, April 2011, Principle II “User choice over 
online behavioural advertising”. 
Each third party should make available a mechanism for web users to exercise their choice with respect to the collection and use 
of data for OBA purposes and the transfer of such data to third parties for OBA. Such choice should be available from the notice 
described in I.A. 1 and via the OBA User Choice Site.” 
According to the definitions provided by IAB Online behavioral advertising means the collection of data from a particular 
computer of device regarding web viewing behaviors over time and across multiple web domains not under Common control for 
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(B)	  	  Integration.	  A	  more	  radical	  response	  to	  policy	  coordination	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  is	  
to	  move	  from	  multiple	  regimes	  to	  a	  single	  multi-­‐policy	  regime.	  In	  a	  way	  somewhat	  similar	  
to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  in	  micro-­‐governance,	  the	  integration	  of	  
single	  regimes	  into	  one	  multi-­‐policy	  regime	  is	  observed,	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  conflicts	  
or	  simply	  to	  coordinate	  different	  and	  sometimes	  conflicting	  goals,	  associated	  to	  different	  
constituencies	  at	  the	  transnational	  level42.	  Over	  time	  some	  regimes	  have	  merged,	  becoming	  
multi-­‐policy.	  Integration	  among	  regimes	  can	  take	  different	  forms,	  ranging	  from	  the	  creation	  
of	  loose	  organizations	  to	  the	  conclusion	  of	  regulatory	  contracts	  (networks	  and	  
agreements),	  to	  federations	  of	  different	  organizations	  (closed	  organizations).	  Examples	  of	  
international	  framework	  agreements	  are	  very	  common	  in	  the	  field	  of	  labour	  standards	  
where	  international	  trade	  unions	  and	  MNCs	  conclude	  agreements	  on	  rights	  and	  
employment	  standards	  that	  commit	  the	  MNC	  with	  its	  own	  employees	  and	  the	  whole	  supply	  
chain.	  Integration	  does	  not	  solve	  the	  conflict	  per	  se.	  It	  moves	  from	  inter	  to	  intra-­‐
organizational	  level	  and	  shifts	  back	  from	  contractual	  to	  organizational	  devices.	  With	  
integration	  regimes	  coordinated	  via	  contract	  are	  thereafter	  coordinated	  by	  organizations.	  
	  
In	  these	  forms	  there	  is	  clear	  ex	  ante	  knowledge	  about	  the	  need	  to	  coordinate	  different	  
regimes;	  regimes’	  representatives	  negotiate	  to	  identify	  the	  best	  mechanisms	  to	  achieve	  
coordination	  while	  remaining	  legally	  fully	  independent.	  When	  information	  is	  incomplete	  or	  
the	  policy	  interdependence	  mainly	  affects	  third	  parties	  outside	  of	  the	  regimes,	  coordination	  
may	  occur	  through	  litigation,	  given	  the	  high	  level	  of	  transaction	  costs.	  At	  transnational	  
level,	  regulation	  through	  litigation	  has	  been	  extensively	  used	  in	  some	  areas	  like	  
fundamental	  rights	  while	  a	  more	  balanced	  combination	  between	  ex	  ante	  regulatory	  
cooperation	  and	  ex	  post	  judicial	  coordination	  has	  taken	  place	  in	  other	  sectors.	  Judicial	  
conflicts’	  resolution	  is	  what	  we	  turn	  to	  now.	  
	  
Regulatory	  judicial	  governance	  	  
	  
The	  shift	  from	  a	  hierarchical	  to	  a	  cooperative	  approach	  concerning	  sources	  of	  law	  has	  
produced	  a	  change	  of	  tools	  for	  solving	  conflicts	  among	  regimes43.	  The	  contractual	  
mechanisms	  just	  described	  provide	  a	  rich	  yet	  insufficient	  toolbox	  for	  coordination	  and	  
conflict	  resolution	  among	  different	  TPR	  regimes.	  While	  the	  tools	  concerning	  conflicts	  and	  
coordination	  among	  public	  international	  regimes	  are	  today	  rather	  sophisticated,	  less	  
developed	  are	  those	  concerning	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  coordination	  among	  private	  
transnational	  regimes.	  Judicial	  governance	  complements	  ex	  ante	  conflict	  resolution	  with	  ex	  
post	  mechanisms.	  There	  are	  different	  reasons	  for	  this.	  The	  first	  and	  most	  important	  is	  
common	  to	  all	  ex	  ante	  mechanisms:	  the	  inability	  to	  foresee	  all	  possible	  reasons	  for	  conflicts	  
                                                                                                                                                       
the purpose of using such data to predict web user preferences or interests to deliver online advertising to that particular computer 
or device based on the preferences or interests inferred from such web viewing behaviors. 
42 This is a complementary view to that expressed by Abbott and Snidal (2009) who describe the trend towards integration on the 
basis of bundling competencies. In particular they identify four competencies necessary to effective transnational regulation: 
independence, representativeness, expertise and operational capacities. 
43  Cassese, supra note 33. 
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and	  the	  necessity	  of	  operating	  with	  incomplete	  ‘regulatory	  contracts’	  that	  can	  trigger	  
renegotiations	  among	  regimes	  but	  do	  not	  ensure	  a	  final	  positive	  result	  e.g.	  the	  completion	  
of	  the	  regulatory	  contract	  by	  parties’	  gap	  filling.	  	  
Judicial	  governance	  provides	  coordination	  among	  conflicting	  regimes	  where	  hierarchy	  has	  
been	  replaced	  by	  more	  complex	  techniques,	  combining	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  
coordination	  among	  courts44.	  	  
	  
Judicial	  governance	  of	  conflicting	  regimes	  operates	  along	  two	  dimensions:	  (1)	  horizontal,	  
among	  states	  or	  supranational	  courts,	  (2)	  vertical,	  between	  supranational	  and	  national	  
courts.	  
	  
Coordination	  among	  regimes	  has	  been	  promoted	  by	  judicial	  gap-­‐filling	  especially	  when	  
disputes	  concern	  the	  boundaries	  of	  regimes.	  For	  example	  disputes	  arise	  on	  whether	  rules	  
concerning	  fundamental	  rights	  can	  apply	  to	  food	  safety	  or	  rules	  concerning	  environmental	  
protection	  should	  apply	  to	  free	  trade.	  The	  need	  for	  bridging	  lacunas	  has	  increased	  the	  
regulatory	  function	  of	  judicial	  governance,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  general	  principles	  in	  the	  field	  
of	  transnational	  private	  regulation.	  	  
	  
Courts,	  in	  particular	  domestic	  ones,	  have	  long	  been	  faced	  with	  the	  resolution	  of	  conflicts	  
among	  different	  legal	  regimes,	  both	  public	  and	  private.	  At	  times	  conflict	  is	  altogether	  
denied,	  at	  other	  times	  it	  has	  to	  be	  solved.	  Separation	  among	  independent	  jurisdictions	  
defined	  by	  their	  scope	  may	  provide	  a	  formal	  boundary,	  thereby	  reducing	  the	  emergence	  of	  
conflicts.	  Hence,	  one	  technique	  to	  avoid	  conflicts	  (at	  least	  formally)	  is	  to	  deny	  
interdependence	  and	  claim	  independence	  and	  separation	  among	  regimes.	  Accordingly	  
trade	  rules	  would	  have	  a	  different	  scope	  from	  human	  rights	  or	  environmental	  protection	  
and	  the	  principle	  of	  finality	  would	  avoid	  or	  minimize	  collisions	  between	  regimes.	  In	  public	  
international	  law	  this	  perspective	  has	  been	  rightly	  criticized45.	  This	  approach	  begs	  the	  
question	  by	  hiding	  policy	  interdependences:	  clearly	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  conflict	  depends	  
on	  the	  ‘recognition’	  of	  the	  interdependence	  among	  regimes.	  Courts	  have	  recognized	  the	  
compatibility	  between	  autonomous	  legal	  orders	  and	  their	  interdependence	  through	  
devising	  coordinating	  mechanisms	  that	  prevent	  or	  solve	  conflicts.	  Different	  patterns	  have	  
been	  followed:	  some	  have	  been	  seeking	  general	  principles	  of	  international	  law	  and	  in	  
particular	  an	  international	  rule	  of	  law,	  others	  have	  operated	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis.	  A	  similar	  
approach	  should	  be	  taken	  in	  relation	  to	  TPR	  by	  recognizing	  the	  link	  between	  policy	  
interdependence	  and	  conflict.	  	  
	  
Among	  the	  most	  important	  devices	  deployed	  by	  courts	  are	  the	  principles	  of	  reciprocity,	  
judicial	  comity,	  equivalent	  protection,	  margin	  of	  appreciation,	  extraterritoriality	  and	  the	  
                                                
44  YUVAL SHANY, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2007); 
Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 59(2009); THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY 
AND SUBSIDIARITY (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany, eds., 2008); Sabino Cassese, The Constitutional Function of  Supranational 
Courts: From Global Legal Space to Global Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS IN A CHANGING 
WORLD, 231, 233 (S. Flogaitis ed., 2009). 
45  International Law Commission, supra note 3. 
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effects-­‐based	  approach46.	  Sometimes	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  defined	  by	  international	  or	  
transnational	  instruments.	  More	  often	  they	  are	  the	  result	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  are	  
exported	  from	  one	  court	  to	  another.	  Only	  very	  rarely,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  transnational	  
bankruptcy,	  does	  coordination	  operate	  through	  ‘	  court	  to	  court	  agreements’.	  
	  
The	  two	  families	  of	  mechanisms,	  ex	  ante	  cooperation	  and	  judicial	  coordination,	  should	  be	  
seen	  as	  complementary.	  Court	  interventions	  are	  of	  utmost	  importance	  where	  lack	  of	  
coordination	  generates	  externalities	  towards	  third	  parties	  protected	  by	  neither	  regime	  
involved	  in	  the	  cooperative	  venture,	  and	  ex	  ante	  information	  is	  not	  accessible	  at	  reasonable	  
costs.	  Court	  interventions	  are	  also	  relevant	  when	  asymmetric	  powers	  among	  regimes	  are	  
such	  that	  compliance	  with	  coordination	  clauses	  is	  not	  ensured	  by	  peer	  monitoring	  and	  self-­‐
enforcing	  mechanisms.	  Yet	  judicial	  coordination	  of	  private	  regimes	  does	  not	  only	  address	  
externalities,	  asymmetric	  power	  and	  gap-­‐filling	  functions.	  It	  can	  also	  provide	  a	  link	  with	  jus	  
cogens,	  general	  principles	  and	  other	  regimes	  that	  private	  regulators	  may	  not	  otherwise	  
have	  incentives	  to	  put	  in	  place.	  The	  integration	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  dimension	  
at	  transnational	  level	  operates	  primarily	  through	  judicial	  coordination	  rather	  than	  
regulatory	  contracts.	  
	  
The	  relationship	  between	  ex	  ante	  regulatory	  cooperation	  and	  ex	  post	  judicial	  coordination	  
is	  not	  without	  problems.	  Clearly	  there	  is	  an	  institutional	  tension	  between	  the	  former,	  
where	  private	  regulators	  define	  the	  degree	  and	  modes	  of	  coordination,	  and	  the	  latter,	  
where,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  litigation,	  courts	  create	  obligations	  concerning	  loyal	  cooperation	  
among	  private	  regulators.	  In	  the	  private	  domain,	  freedom	  of	  contract	  and	  freedom	  of	  
association	  limit	  judicial	  intervention	  by	  courts	  and	  constrain	  judicial	  coordination	  to	  a	  
larger	  extent	  than	  the	  public	  domain,	  where	  the	  institutional	  balance	  between	  ex	  ante	  
cooperation	  and	  ex	  post	  judicial	  coordination	  differs.	  
 
On	  the	  Link	  between	  Micro-­‐	  and	  Macro-­‐Governance	  and	  its	  Systemic	  
Implications	  
 
The	  distinction	  between	  organizations	  and	  regimes	  has	  showed	  that	  different	  yet	  similar	  
questions	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  conflicts	  between	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  in	  single	  
organizations,	  in	  single	  regimes	  within	  which	  single	  or	  multiple	  regulators	  co-­‐exist,	  and	  in	  
multiple	  regimes,	  characterized	  by	  policy	  conflicts.	  
	  
All	  these	  levels	  of	  the	  transnational	  regulatory	  space	  present	  conflicts	  between	  regulatees	  
and	  beneficiaries	  and	  among	  different	  constituencies,	  firms,	  consumers,	  and	  investors	  
within	  each	  group,	  calling	  for	  governance	  responses	  in	  addition	  to,	  or	  as	  a	  replacement	  for,	  
traditional	  legal	  tools	  based	  on	  hierarchy	  or	  even	  more	  innovative	  normative	  tools.	  
	  
In	  relation	  to	  single	  organizations	  the	  different	  structures	  of	  regulatory	  relationships	  
                                                
46  Shany, supra note 41; Cassese, supra note 33. 
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define	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  and	  help	  classifying	  different	  governance	  responses	  which	  were	  
grouped	  in	  the	  four	  different	  models	  above.	  Micro-­‐governance	  is	  mainly	  related	  to	  intra-­‐
organizational	  level	  and	  the	  responses	  to	  conflicts	  are	  primarily	  associated	  with	  
organizational	  design	  that	  grant	  participatory	  rights	  and/or	  duty	  to	  give	  reasons	  to	  
stakeholders	  outside	  the	  legal	  boundary	  of	  the	  organizations.	  The	  role	  of	  judicial	  
governance	  is	  rather	  limited	  here.	  	  
	  
In	  relation	  to	  single	  regimes	  different	  interests,	  within	  the	  same	  policy	  field,	  may	  be	  
represented	  by	  different	  organizations.	  Models	  include	  a	  single	  monopolist,	  an	  oligopoly	  or	  
multiple	  organizations	  competing	  over	  regulatees	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  different	  classes	  of	  
beneficiaries.	  In	  this	  case	  governance	  responses	  focus	  on	  instruments	  to	  coordinate	  and	  to	  
solve	  conflicts	  among	  organizations	  and	  on	  the	  combination	  between	  transactional	  and	  
social	  and	  market	  accountability	  mechanisms.	  Organizational	  tools	  like	  cross	  participation	  
in	  boards	  is	  not	  uncommon	  but	  does	  not	  suffice	  and	  it	  is	  complemented	  with	  agreements	  
and	  regulatory	  contracts47.	  	  
	  
The	  third	  dimension	  is	  that	  of	  multiple	  regimes	  where	  a	  combination	  of	  ex	  ante	  
cooperation	  and	  ex	  post	  judicial	  coordination	  is	  deployed.	  	  
	  
Different	  policy	  goals	  often	  reflect	  different	  interests	  within	  the	  regulatory	  relationship.	  In	  
the	  more	  radical	  case	  those	  who	  are	  potential	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  regulatory	  process,	  
consumer	  or	  environmental	  organizations,	  investors	  or	  depositors	  in	  the	  financial	  market,	  
become	  regulators	  and	  set	  forth	  a	  new	  regime.	  In	  the	  less	  radical	  case	  a	  group	  of	  the	  
regulated	  entities	  exit	  a	  regime	  and	  create	  a	  new	  one,	  often	  in	  competition	  with	  the	  
previous.	  
	  
Conflicts	  among	  regimes	  thus	  reflect	  their	  sector	  specificity	  and	  focus	  on	  single	  policies	  but	  
might	  bring	  about	  paradoxical	  results:	  a	  firm	  complying	  with	  trade	  rules	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  
sanctions	  under	  a	  code	  of	  conduct	  for	  violations	  of	  its	  CSR	  principles.	  If	  each	  regime	  reflects	  
only	  its	  own	  logic	  and	  policy	  goals,	  the	  outcome	  might	  be	  internally	  rational	  yet	  
systemically	  problematic.	  Macro-­‐governance	  might	  collide	  with	  micro-­‐governance	  and	  
require	  coordination	  mechanisms	  contributing	  to	  policy	  coordination.	  Regimes	  often	  
interact	  and	  require	  coordination	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  conflicts	  or	  solve	  them	  when	  they	  
arise48.	  Conflicts	  among	  regimes	  require	  not	  only	  rules	  that	  avoid	  conflicts	  but	  also	  
governance	  responses	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  can	  respect	  autonomy	  but	  govern	  
interdependences.	  
	  
Micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐governance	  are	  therefore	  strategically	  intertwined	  and	  the	  functional	  
approach,	  adopted	  in	  this	  essay,	  suggests	  that	  rather	  than	  concentrating	  exclusively	  upon	  
the	  legal	  boundaries	  of	  organizations	  and	  regimes,	  which	  are	  very	  important	  for	  
determining	  the	  scope	  and	  jurisdictions	  of	  regulators,	  one	  should	  also	  focus	  on	  the	  effects	  
                                                
47  ISO is a good illustration. 
48  Macro-governance affects different schemes of coordination/competition among regimes which reflect the internal 
structure of each of them; while there is clearly a correlation between micro and macro-governance it is beyond the scope of this 
essay to identify the relevant structural variables of macro-governance based on the differences in micro-governance.  
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In	  this	  essay	  the	  regulatory	  relationship	  has	  been	  selected	  as	  the	  relevant	  notion	  to	  explain	  
governance	  responses	  to	  conflicting	  interests	  in	  transnational	  regulatory	  processes.	  While	  
it	  is	  recognized	  that	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  among	  different	  constituencies	  involved	  in	  the	  
regulatory	  process	  do	  not	  constitute	  the	  only	  explanatory	  variable	  to	  describe	  the	  
architecture	  of	  TPR,	  its	  importance	  has	  been	  neglected.	  
	  
Three	  functional	  levels	  in	  the	  transnational	  regulatory	  space	  have	  been	  identified:	  
individual	  organizations,	  single	  and	  multiple	  regimes,	  associating	  the	  former	  with	  micro-­‐	  
and	  the	  latter	  two	  with	  macro-­‐governance	  issues.	  The	  thesis	  is	  that	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  
may	  be	  solved	  by	  using	  micro	  or	  macro-­‐governance	  responses	  depending	  on	  how	  
regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  have	  chosen	  to	  locate	  themselves	  in	  the	  regulatory	  space.	  
Often	  they	  select	  different	  strategies	  and	  micro	  and	  macro	  governance	  co-­‐exist.	  
	  
In	  micro-­‐governance	  the	  conflict	  between	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries	  gives	  rise	  to	  at	  least	  
four	  models	  with	  different	  organizational	  forms	  depending	  on	  the	  position	  of	  the	  
beneficiaries	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  organization	  and,	  when	  they	  are	  inside	  as	  in	  the	  multi-­‐
stakeholder	  model,	  on	  their	  bargaining	  power	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  different	  classes	  of	  
regulatees.	  	  
	  
In	  macro-­‐governance	  concerning	  a	  single	  regime	  often	  the	  regulatory	  relationship	  breaks	  
down	  into	  multiple	  organizations,	  each	  one	  representing	  the	  interests	  of	  (a	  class	  of)	  
regulatees	  and/or	  beneficiaries.	  The	  relationship	  varies	  depending	  on	  whether	  competition	  
or	  cooperation	  prevails.	  Unlike	  the	  case	  of	  micro-­‐governance,	  here	  competition	  may	  arise	  
among	  organizations	  within	  the	  same	  regime.	  Transactional	  rather	  than	  organizational	  
tools	  are	  deployed.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  dimension	  within	  macro-­‐governance	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  interplay	  among	  
different	  regimes	  operating	  alongside	  competition	  and	  cooperation.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  
interests,	  associated	  with	  different	  conflicting	  policy	  goals,	  give	  rise	  to	  regimes	  (trade	  
versus	  environment,	  e-­‐commerce	  versus	  data	  protection,	  employment	  versus	  
environment)	  representing	  various	  classes	  of	  regulatees	  and	  beneficiaries.	  On	  this	  third	  
level,	  we	  again	  find	  competition	  and	  cooperation.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  latter	  two	  
complementary	  responses,	  ex	  ante	  cooperation	  and	  ex	  post	  judicial	  coordination	  have	  been	  
identified	  while	  a	  growing	  trend	  towards	  regime	  integration	  is	  taking	  place.	  The	  role	  of	  
judicial	  coordination	  increases	  when	  moving	  from	  micro	  to	  macro-­‐governance	  and	  it	  must	  
be	  combined	  with	  transactional	  instruments	  devised	  by	  the	  regimes.	  Governance	  
responses	  are	  needed	  to	  provide	  coordination	  and	  to	  solve	  conflicts	  among	  regimes	  since	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the	  traditional	  legal	  tools,	  based	  on	  hierarchy,	  are	  insufficient.	  Thus,	  they	  do	  not	  entirely	  
substitute	  for	  hierarchy,	  but	  instead	  complement	  it.	  As	  has	  become	  clear	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
public	  international	  law,	  coordination	  by	  way	  of	  negotiation	  is	  only	  one	  possibility	  but	  
often	  proves	  to	  be	  very	  costly	  and	  rather	  ineffective.	  In	  this	  framework,	  courts,	  in	  particular	  
domestic	  ones,	  have	  come	  to	  play	  a	  very	  relevant	  role.	  
	  
The	  future	  of	  TPR	  and	  its	  effectiveness	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  choice	  and	  the	  combinations	  
among	  these	  different	  levels	  which	  will	  partly	  driven	  by	  endogenous	  factors,	  i.e.	  the	  
relationships	  between	  MNCs	  and	  SMEs	  in	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries,	  and	  partly	  
driven	  by	  exogenous	  legal	  and	  non	  legal	  factors,	  among	  which	  competition	  law	  is	  likely	  to	  
play	  an	  important	  role.	  
	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
